Are We Observing The Start of a New Civil War in Syria?
Tensions between Damascus and Kurdish controlled areas in Eastern Syria are escalating. The fate of the country hangs in the balance as the US plans to withdraw its troops from Syria.
The embers are only smoldering since the fall of the long-time Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad. It is only a little less than two months ago that the 59-year old autocrat fled the country with his tail between his legs, substituting the lavish floors of his Damascus Presidential Palace, with the cold comfort of his solemn exile in an apartment in Moscow. Albeit that the reality has much changed for Syria’s former dictator, back home, on the ground in Syria, the faint echo of the drums of war pierce the hot desert air once again.
As of writing, the much-awaited peace that in December settled upon the war-torn country, has not reached the far eastern Kurdish-held territories of the Autonomous Administration of North and Eastern Syria (AANES), better known under the name of Rojava. About 20% of the country’s internationally recognized territory falls under the control of the Kurds in this region. Importantly, it also holds most of Syria’s resources, including oil, gas, grains, and water.
Here, during the civil-war, Syria’s massive minority of ethnic Kurds established a de-facto autonomous state, providing all the necessities, that are the mark of one. These include education, social benefits, and the region even boasts a sizeable army, going under the name of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). On a historic note, these Kurdish fighters were vital in the culling of ISIS, and are, accordingly, by many in the West viewed as an ally in the region. The SDF run and maintain internment camps housing 9,000 ISIS fighters, but rely on support from the U.S.-backed coalition for financial support in these detention operations.
Nonetheless, the recent shattering of the long-reigning political status quo in Syria: the flight of Assad, and the rise to power of the elusive Ahmad al-Sharaa, backed up by his Hayat Tahir al-Sham (HTS) milita, has done much to uproot the situation in which the Kurds found themselves. What could before be deemed as a perilous, but yet predictable situation, has now turned into an existential crisis for the Kurds. Gone is Assad, who in the latter years of the war seemed relatively content to keep a low profile and consolidate his gains, and in is a new regime seemingly hell-bent on reunifying Syria, whether through diplomatic or military means. On top of this, two other factors are paving the way for a new regional conflict. HTS’ links to Erdogan’s Türkiye and the erratic wild-card of a certain president in the White House. The stage is set for conflict if diplomatic measures are not taken.
A Diplomatic Solution?
After the fall of Assad, optimism was wide-spread at the advent of a new political reality in Syria. Al-Sharaa, seemingly overnight, exchanged his military khaki for the attire of a statesman, appearing in suit and tie and meeting with foreign leaders to discuss the rebuilding of the country and its diplomatic situation. While his past links to Al-Qaeda and ISIS, were worrisome ‘characteristics’ in the eyes of many, both at home and abroad, his conciliatory rhetoric and promises of being a changed man, has worked to assure many of his good intentions. As a result of this, entities such as the EU is already talking about easing sanctions on the country.
One of Saraa’s first priorities post-Assad was to reach out to the Kurds in search of a diplomatic solution to what is essentially a division of the country. Damascus, seemed convinced that with what they deemed the raison d’etre of the SDF - the fight against ISIS and the protection of Rojava’s population against Assad’s oppression - now gone, reunification was not so far down the line. A secret meeting between Sharaa and the leader of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi was held on December 30th, to negotiate the future of the country. The details of this meeting later became public, revealing that despite some confidence-building measures, the two sides are still very far apart from a solution.
What we know about Damascus’s negotiating stance is the following: the SDF should dissolve itself and put its approximately 70,000 fighters under the command of Sharaa’s new defense ministry. This demand has also been posed to the other armed groups of Syria, amongst whom the SDF is the last armed group waiting to submit. Damascus also demands the expulsion of dozens of non-Syrian leaders from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), with Turkish members handed over to Ankara. Why this is, we’ll return to later in the article. Additionally, Damascus calls for dissolving the autonomous administration while agreeing to decentralization and Kurdish rights, returning strategic resources to Damascus, coupled with the transfer of control of Syria’s borders with Türkiye and Iraq to the central government. The new government also demands to take over the management of relations with the US-led international coalition, and the running of prisons and camps housing ISIS fighters and their families.
On the other hand, the negotiators from the AANES held firm on their own counterproposals, which included maintaining the SDF as an autonomous military bloc within the new Syrian army, preserving the structure of the autonomous administration, and ensuring that SDF fighters serve in their home regions in northeastern Syria. Their negotiators also demanded that the Kurds retain a fixed share of strategic resources, maintain military control over their borders, and that Kurdish participation in the preparation of the upcoming national dialogue conference, the Prime Minister’s office, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be secured. They also call for explicit constitutional recognition of Kurdish rights. This last point is of particular importance as the Kurds were essentially stateless under the former Assad regime, not recognized on par with the country’s Arabs as equal citizens.
On a more conciliatory note, Abdi supposedly agreed to some confidence-building measures, such as raising the new Syrian flag, handing over civilian border crossings to Damascus, and restoring control over “security squares” previously controlled by the Assad regime in SDF territory.
On a further positive note, both parties agreed to hold another round of talks and establish negotiation committees ahead of the proposed national conference, scheduled to be held in the near future.
What is perhaps the most important take-away from these negotiations, however, is the reluctance of the Kurds to surrender what could be deemed the closest attempt at a Kurdish state in decades. The Kurds, if they are not severely pressured through military means, will most likely not settle for less than some degree of autonomy. What compounds the risks of conflict, however, is Damascus’ close relationship with Ankara.
Turkish Intervention
Ankara’s intense “preoccupation” with the future of the Kurds, whether this be in Iraq or Syria, and its fear of anything resembling a Kurdish state in Türkiye’s back yard, has shaped Ankara’s involvement in the region over the last decade. Its leader, Erdogan, accuses one of the main elements of the SDF, the so-called ‘People’s Protection Units’ or YPG, of having connections to the Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK). This is a deal-breaker for Ankara, as they consider the PKK a terrorist organisation. The recent terrorist attack at an aerospace company near Ankara, two months ago, has only served to highlight the necessity for action in preventing a ‘hostile’ Kurdish state on its southern border. Because of this, Türkiye has regularly bombed the AANES since 2015, and has amongst other things targeted civilian infrastructure, which in an extreme case in 2024, cut off 1 million people from clean water and electricity.
On the ground, Türkiye has sought to work out a solution by occupying a ‘safe-zone’ in Northern Syria, and occupying the majority-Kurdish Afrin province in North Western Syria. We have in an earlier article here at TLR which covered the negative implications of Turkish-sponsored groups in this region, with a focus on the destruction of historical heritage sites (read more here). And in what could be deemed the foreign-policy coup of the decade, Türkiye has managed to secure for itself a regime friendly to Ankara in Damascus, that turns a blind eye to the continued Turkish support for its Syrian proxy group, the Syrian National Army (SNA), and its land operations against the Kurds in Northern Syria. Heavy fighting between the SNA and the SDF is ongoing at strategic locations such as the Tishreen Dam, with many casualties on both sides as the result. Similarily, the Syrian regime does not seem to have required Ankara to halt the Turkish Air Force’s airstrikes on the AANES, perhaps due to the fact, that a weaker AANES serves the interests of both parties, as the negotiation power of the SDF diminishes with each bombing.
Türkiye’s close relationship with Sharaa’s regime and hostile stance towards PKK elements in the AANES most likely explain the specific terms of Damascus’ negotiation position related to the PKK. More specifically, the expulsion and transfer of PKK leaders from the AANES into Ankara’s custody. Pro-Türkiye rhetoric in Damascus seems to be hardening; on January 15th Syrian Foreign Minister, Asaad Hassan Al-Shibani, adopted a more escalatory tone at a meeting in Ankara, saying that the U.S.-backed SDF-presence in Eastern Syria was “no longer justified” and that “the new administration would not allow Syrian land to be a source of threats to Turkiye”. A few days later, Syria’s defence minister, Murhaf Abu Qasra, explicitly rejected integrating the SDF as a military bloc into the army, adding that while the government was open to talks with the SDF about dismantling, “if we have to use force, we will be ready.”
Atleast some elements of the Kurdish bloc, however, are also greatly complicating the peace efforts. The PKK has reportedly carried out four car bomb attacks in Manbij, Tell Rifaat, and Deir Jamal in Aleppo’s countryside in late December and early January, coinciding with security incidents in Syria’s coastal areas. As a result of this, Damascus has reportedly criticized SDF’s leader Abdi, for what they perceiveas inability on his part to exert control over the disparate elements of his bloc parallel to ongoing investigations. These recent attacks have hardened Ankara’s perceived need for urgency in dismantling PKK elements in the AANES. Perhaps as a last-ditch effort to hold onto a fragment of its former power in the country, Damascus points to Iran as the main driver behind these recent attacks. They cite Iran’s close relationship with the PKK in Iraq, and recent calls, made before the attacks, by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to rise against the “new sunni islamists rulers”. These verity of these accusations levelled at Iran are hard to establish. Nonetheless, it is difficult not to imagine that Teheran is displeased with the recent loss of one of its most important allies in the region, and could take punitive or distabilizing measures as a result.
The Wild Card - Trump and a U.S. Withdrawal
The real wildcard in these ongoing developments in Syria, is contingent on developments on the opposite side of the Atlantic; more specifically on a man notorious for his spontaneity, or rather - unreliability. Somewhat paradoxically to the hemispheric isolationism engraved in the mantra of “America first”, President Donald J. Trump, has not shied away from getting involved in the affairs of the Middle East. His recent proposal to turn Gaza into the “Riviera” of the Middle East: a piece of sunshine sea-side real estate under the supervision of the U.S., being probably the most ‘creative’ example. According to the Pentagon, as of December, the U.S. had about 2000 troops deployed in Syria. Their mission is described as “degrading the Islamic State terrorist group and support local partners operating there”. These local partners, as mentioned, include the SDF.
However, the Department of Defense is now seemingly drawing up plans for a full withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria, two U.S. defense officials told NBC News on February 4th. And this withdrawal may come sooner rather than later. In the same article, the defence officials stated that Pentagon officials are drawing up plans for a full withdrawal in 30, 60 or 90 days. This new development comes in the wake of an Oval Office media event on January 30th where Trump was asked about current events in Syria. To this he replied: “We’re not getting, we’re not involved in Syria […] Syria is its own mess. They got enough messes over there. They don’t need us involved in everyone.” Whether this withdrawal actually materializes remains to be seen. He has attempted it before. In late 2019, Trump ordered Secretary of Defense Jamis Mattis to withdraw all U.S. troops from Syria. Mattis pushed back against the order and ultimately resigned in protest. Nonetheless, Trump withdrew most U.S. troops but subsequently moved them back, where they remain to this day.
A withdrawal could serve as both an escalatory and conciliatory measure in relation to a potential Syrian conflict. Interestingly, it might also be a smarter move in securing long-term U.S. interests, than what it appears at first glance.
On one hand, a U.S. withdrawal could force the SDF divert its troops towards offensive operations against the SNA and abandon its internment camps, freeing thousands of ISIS fighters. This would most likely be deemed unacceptable by the new Syrian government, leading them to take military measures, and deemed a threat by Ankara, convincing Türkiye to step up its military operations in Syria.
This next point is cynical, perhaps more than the author would like it to be. On the other hand, by committing a second ‘betrayal of the Kurds’, which a withdrawal would arguably be, the U.S. could solve one of its biggest diplomatic headaches in years, which could help ease the way for peace in Syria - albeit not one that is favourable to the Kurds. The U.S. support for the SDF is, per excellence, a diplomatic headache for Washington. On the one hand, the U.S. is interested in keeping the pressure on ISIS, and probably worried about how another Kurdish betrayal (the first being the U.S. withdrawal from Syria in 2019) would make it look to its allies. On the other hand, maintaining strong relations with Türkiye, both as a NATO ally and given its role in Syria and the broader Middle East, is also crucial to Washington. Similarily, sustaining the weak position in which Iran finds itself after the removal of Assad, a key ally of Iran, is paramount to U.S. policy. Hence developing relations with the new Damascus government is paramount. By supporting a counter-insurgency campaign without an obvious end, Washington risks alienating both parties. Furthermore, by supporting a strong quasi-independent entity inside Syria, the U.S. could indirectly be inspiring other areas to opt out of Damascus’ control, thus impairing the establishment of a strong, unified Syria, which could be perhaps an even stronger ally in finally rooting out ISIS. This rests on the assumption of course, that the U.S. be willing to remove HTS from its list of foreign terrorist organizations.
A stronger governmentwould have a stronger negotiation position when dealing with the Kurds. This may prove to curtail dreams of Kurdish autonomy, but a strong, functioning government is vital in creating the conditions for Syria’s 12 million refugees and internally displaced people to return home, which could in turn also dramatically reduce the financial burden of key U.S. allies such as the EU and Türkiye holding millions of Syrian refugees.
A Possible Path Forward
The Kurds could anticipate Trump’s withdrawal by proposing concrete measures to help expedite the negotiation process, achieving a more favourable end for them. If the SDF sheds its non-Syrian senior PKK group of leaders, withdraws from majority ethnic Arab areas of the northeast, where the population is reportedly increasingly hostile, and turns over key petroleum infrastructure to the central government, this could soften the stance of Damascus. Although these are major concessions, they could prompt Sharaa’s government to allow the integration of the YPG as a political party in Syria. Something similar has already been seen with the arguably PKK-aligned DEM party to be found in the Turkish parliament. Perhaps the new government may even concede that Kurdish troops serve in and be in charge of security in the country’s east, which could help the central government maintain control and the pressure on ISIS.
For such concessions, Sharaa would most likely need to pressure Türkiye to halt the limited military operations of its proxy, the SNA, and bring an end to the country’s air campaign in Syria.
As for autonomy, the SDF could strive for an agreement, possibly modelled on an agreement made by Baghdad with Iraqi Kurds in the 2005 Iraqi constitution, albeit the Syrian version would most likely need to be less formal and expansive in nature. Some degree of self-governance could be agreed (and perhaps also similar initiatives initiated for other local communities around the country formed of various sects), with the integration of SDF units into the new Syrian army, particularily as an anti-ISIS force, similar to the role Kurdish Peshmerga Brigades played in the Iraqi army during the fight against ISIS. Assuringly, an official from the PKK recently told Reuters that the PKK would leave North Eastern Syria if “the SDF maintains a leading role there”. This could help stave off Ankara’s worries.
Breaking The Cycle of War in The Middle East
The Kurds are not in a favourable situation, but much of the potential for a diplomatic solution rests on their capacity to move quickly and engage the new Syrian government with creative diplomatic handywork, which could perhaps be helped along by international actors. Nonetheless, the Syrian government, may arrive at the same conclusion, that the hand of time is playing to their benefit. A US withdrawal from Syria and Turkish incursions into the AANES, may even be viewed as positives in the eyes of Damascus, as they make their opponent’s negotiation position considerably weaker. With that said, the Kurds won’t give up their closest attempt at statehood in decades without a fight. And the possible implications of their desperation: the liberation of thousands of ISIS fighters as troops are diverted to offensive operations, a possible further alignment of PKK elements with Iran, compounded by the human calamity of a return of full-scale war to a Syria that is only barely starting to rebuild, are staggering. Today, the future of the Middle East as we know it, and the future of the threats that have been its scourge over the past decades - Islamist terrorism and Iranian expansion - are being decided in the hot desert of Syria. A positive outcome in Syria, could provide the region with a much needed model of how to bridge differences and move forward against common threats.